City of Alexandria v. J-W Enterprises, Inc. – August 4, 2009

The City of Alexandria contends an off-duty City police officer was injured while collecting a bill for his private employer, and that the trial court erred in finding the officer was acting in his public capacity when he was injured. It also argues the off-duty officer was a J-W Enterprises employee, not an independent contractor. The City also contends the trial court erred in its finding as to the proximate cause of the officer’s injury. Finally, it argues the trial court erred in finding it acted as a “volunteer” when it settled an underlying issue despite its “absolute immunity” with respect to the officer’s actions.

From
The Circuit Court for the City of Alexandria; D.M. Haddock, Judge.

Counsel
Patrick A. Malone, Leonard W. Dooren (Patrick Malone & Associates, P.C.) and Bernard J. DiMuro (DiMuro Ginsberg, P.C.) for appellant.

Robert G. Harrington (Robert Harrington & Associates) for appellee.

Assignments of Error

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that an off-duty police officer can never act as a dual agent at any one time, and further erred in finding that the officer in this case acted solely in his public capacity, where the uncontradicted evidence proved that his sole purpose in confronting the vehicle was to collect a bill for the private employer.

2. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that the officer was not defendant J-W Enterprises’ servant, but rather was an independent contractor, and further erred in determining that any such independent contractor status must necessarily lead to the conclusion that J-W Enterprises could not be held liable for the officer’s actions.

3. The trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the sole proximate cause of injury was the combined actions of the car’s driver and the officer at the precise time of the shooting, and not the officer’s negligent actions in moving himself into a place of danger in front of a speeding car.

4. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the parties’ stipulation that the officer acted in self-defense necessarily absolved him of liability for negligently causing the injury.

5. The trial court erred as a matter of law in deciding that the City had no right to seek contribution because the City had “absolute” immunity for the officer’s actions and so, in settling the underlying dispute, the City acted as a “volunteer.”

Date Granted
7-29-2009